As this is a High traffic post i hope to provide here an answer slightly more undetermined to the original question and thus to provide further background on a JSON Hijacking attack and its consequences
JSON Hijacking as the name suggests is an attack similar to Cross-Site Request Forgery where an attacker can access cross-domain sensitive JSON data from applications that return sensitive data as array literals to GET requests. An example of a JSON call returning an array literal is shown below:
[{"id":"1001","ccnum":"4111111111111111","balance":"2345.15"},
{"id":"1002","ccnum":"5555555555554444","balance":"10345.00"},
{"id":"1003","ccnum":"5105105105105100","balance":"6250.50"}]
This attack can be achieved in 3 major steps:
Step 1: Get an authenticated user to visit a malicious page. Step 2: The malicious page will try and access sensitive data from the application that the user is logged into.This can be done by embedding a script tag in an HTML page since the same-origin policy does not apply to script tags.
<script src="http://<jsonsite>/json_server.php"></script>
The browser will make a GET request to json_server.php
and any authentication cookies of the user will be sent along with the request.
Step 3: At this point while the malicious site has executed the script it does not have access to any sensitive data. Getting access to the data can be achieved by using an object prototype setter. In the code below an object prototypes property is being bound to the defined function when an attempt is being made to set the "ccnum
" property.
Object.prototype.__defineSetter__('ccnum',function(obj){
secrets =secrets.concat(" ", obj);
});
At this point the malicious site has successfully hijacked the sensitive financial data (ccnum)
returned byjson_server.php
JSON
It should be noted that not all browsers support this method; the proof of concept was done on Firefox 3.x.This method has now been deprecated and replaced by the useObject.defineProperty
There is also a variation of this attack that should work on all browsers where full named JavaScript (e.g. pi=3.14159
) is returned instead of a JSON array.
There are several ways in which JSON Hijacking can be prevented:
Since SCRIPT tags can only generate HTTP GET requests, only return JSON objects to POST requests.
Prevent the web browser from interpreting the JSON object as valid JavaScript code.
Implement Cross-Site Request Forgery protection by requiring that a predefined random value be required for all JSON requests.
so as you can see While(1)
comes under the last option. In the most simple terms, while(1)
is an infinite loop which will run till a break statement is issued explicitly. And thus what would be described as a lock for the key to be applied (google break statement). Therefore a JSON hijacking, in which the Hacker has no key will be consistently dismissed.Alas, If you read the JSON block with a parser, the while(1) loop is ignored.
So in conclusion, the while(1)
loop can more easily visualised as a simple break statement cipher that google can use to control flow of data.
However the key word in that statement is the word 'simple'. The usage of authenticated infinite loops has been thankfully removed from basic practice in the years since 2010 due to its absolute decimation of CPU usage when isolated (and the fact the internet has moved away from forcing through crude 'quick-fixes'). Today instead the codebase has preventative measures embedded and the system is not crucial nor effective anymore. (part of this is the move away from JSON Hijacking to more fruitful datafarming techniques that i wont go into at present)
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